GameSec 2017

Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security

October 23-25, 2017, Vienna, Austria

Technical Program (tentative)

DAY 1 – MON OCT 23

Time Session Activity
8:30-9:00   Registration and Breakfast
9:00-9:15   Opening Remarks (Chair, TPC Chair)
9:15-10:10   Plenary Talk 1: A Probabilistic Logic of Cyber Deception
V.S. Subrahmanian, Dartmouth College
10:10-10:40   Break
Session 1: Information/Signaling in games
10:40-11:05 1.A Information Leakage Games
Mário S. Alvim, Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis, Yusuke Kawamoto and Catuscia Palamidessi
11:05-11:30 1.B Proactive Defense Against Physical Denial of Service Attacks using Poisson Signaling Games
Jeffrey Pawlick and Quanyan Zhu
11:30-11:55 1.C Manipulating Adversary's Belief: A Dynamic Game Approach to Deception by Design for Proactive Network Security
Karel Horák, Quanyan Zhu and Branislav Bošanský
11:55-13:30   Lunch
Session 2: Cyber-physical systems
13:30-13:55 2.A Secure Sensor Design for Cyber-Physical Systems Against Advanced Persistent Threats
Muhammed Sayin and Tamer Başar
13:55-14:20 2.B Strategic Defense Against Deceptive Civilian GPS Spoofing of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Tao Zhang and Quanyan Zhu
14:20-14:45 2.C Game-Theoretical Analysis of PLC System Performance in the Presence of Jamming Attacks
Yun Ai, Manav Bhatnagar, Michael Cheffena, Aashish Mathur and Artem Sedakov
14:45-15:10 2.D Building Real Stackelberg Security Games for Border Patrols
Victor Bucarey, Carlos Casorrán, Óscar Figueroa, Karla Rosas, Hugo Navarrete and Fernando Ordóñez
15:10-15:40   Break
Session 3: Special Track on "Data-Centric Models and Applications"
15:40-16:05 3.A Optimal Patrol Planning for Green Security Games with Black-Box Attackers
Haifeng Xu, Benjamin Ford, Fei Fang, Bistra Dilkina, Andrew Plumptre, Milind Tambe, Margaret Driciru, Fred Wanyama, Aggrey Rwetsiba, Mustapha Nsubaga and Joshua Mabonga
16:05-16:30 3.B Optimizing Traffic Enforcement: From the Lab to the Roads
Ariel Rosenfeld, Oleg Maksimov and Sarit Kraus
16:30-16:55 3.C VIOLA: Video Labeling Application for Security Domains
Elizabeth Bondi, Fei Fang, Debarun Kar, Venil Noronha, Donnabell Dmello, Milind Tambe, Arvind Iyer and Robert Hannaford
16:55-17:20 3.D Deterrence of Cyber Attackers in a Three-player Behavioral Game
Jinshu Cui, Heather Rosoff and Richard S. John
17:20-18:30   Panel Discussion

DAY 2 – TUE OCT 24

Time Session Activity
8:30-9:15   Registration and Breakfast
9:15-10:10   Plenary Talk 2: A brief tour through Network Science

Piet Van Mieghem, Delft University of Technology
10:10-10:40   Break
Session 4: Network security
10:40-11:05 4.A A Game Theoretical Model for Optimal Distribution of Network Security Resources
Ziad Ismail, Christophe Kiennert, Jean Leneutre and Lin Chen
11:05-11:30 4.B A Stochastic Game-Theoretic Model for Smart Grid Communication Networks
Xiaobing He and Hermann de Meer
11:30-11:55 4.C A Stackelberg Game and Markov Modeling of Moving Target Defense
Xiaotao Feng, Zizhan Zheng, Prasant Mohapatra and Derya Cansever
11:55-13:30   Lunch
AIT "HyRiM" Project Demo
Session 5: Economic models
13:30-13:55 5.A The U.S. Vulnerabilities Equities Process: An Economic Perspective
Tristan Caulfield, Christos Ioannidis and David Pym
13:55-14:20 5.B Incentive compatibility of pay per last N shares in Bitcoin mining pools
Yevhen Zolotavkin, Julian García and Carsten Rudolph
14:20-14:45 5.C On the Economics of Ransomware
Aron Laszka, Sadegh Farhang and Jens Grossklags
14:45-15:10 5.D Three Layer Game Theoretic Decision Framework for Cyber-Investment and Cyber-Insurance
Deepak Kumar Tosh, Iman Vakilinia, Sachin Shetty, Shamik Sengupta, Charles Kamhoua, Laurent Njilla and Kevin Kwiat
15:10-15:40   Break
Session 6: Dynamic Games
15:40-16:05 6.A Dynamics of Strategic Protection Against Virus Propagation in Heterogeneous Complex Networks
Yezekael Hayel and Quanyan Zhu
16:05-16:30 6.B A Large-Scale Markov Game Approach to Dynamic Protection of Interdependent Infrastructure Networks
Linan Huang, Juntao Chen and Quanyan Zhu
16:30-16:55 6.C Adaptivity in Network Interdiction
Bastián Bahamondes, José Correa, Jannik Matuschke and Gianpaolo Oriolo
18:30-21:00   Conference Dinner

DAY 3 – WED OCT 25

Time Session Activity
8:30-9:00   Registration and Breakfast
Session 7: Theory/Data exfiltration
9:00-9:25 7.A Efficient Rational Proofs for Space Bounded Computations
Matteo Campanelli and Rosario Gennaro
9:25-9:50 7.B On the Cost of Game Playing: How to Control the Expenses in Mixed Strategies
Stefan Rass, Sandra König and Stefan Schauer
9:50-10:15 7.C A Stackelberg Game Model for Botnet Data Exfiltration
Thanh Nguyen, Michael P. Wellman and Satinder Singh
10:15-10:40 7.D Optimal strategies for detecting data exfiltration by internal and external attackers
Karel Durkota, Viliam Lisý, Christopher Kiekintveld, Karel Horák, Branislav Bošansky and Tomáš Pevný
10:40-11:00   Break
Session 8: Behavioral games
11:00-11:25 8.A An Ultimatum Game Model for the Evolution of Privacy in Jointly Managed Content
Sarah Rajtmajer, Anna Squicciarini, Jose Such, Justin Semonsen and Andrew Belmonte
11:25-11:50 8.B Game-theoretic Goal Recognition Models with Applications to Security Domains
Samuel Ang, Hau Chan, Albert Jiang and William Yeoh
11:50-12:15 8.D Security games with probabilistic constraints on the agent’s strategy
Corine M. Laan, Ana Isabel Barros, Richard J. Boucherie and Herman Monsuur
12:15-12:30   Closing Remarks (Chair)