Conference Program

Time	26 October	27 October	28 October
9:00–9:30	Opening Remarks	-	-
9:30–10:30	Tutorial 1	Keynote 1	Keynote 2
10:30–11:00	Coffee Break	Coffee Break	Coffee Break
11:00–12:30	Tutorial 2	Session 3	Session 6
12:30–14:00	Lunch Break	Lunch Break	Lunch Break
14:00–15:30	Session 1	Session 4	Poster Session
15:30–16:00	Coffee Break	Coffee Break	Awards and Closing Remarks
16:00–17:30	Session 2	Session 5	-

Technical Sessions

Session 1: Deception in Security

26 October, 14:00–15:30

1. Epistemic Deception: An Information-Design Framework for Adversarial Belief Manipulation
   Quanyan Zhu
2. A Game-Theoretic Framework for Deception and Counter-Deception in Heterogeneous Drone Swarms
   Andrew Clark, Ahmad Bilal Asghar, Charles A Kamhoua
3. Beyond Best Response: Quantal Stackelberg Deception as Insurance Against Attacker Misspecification
   Asif Rahman, Christopher Kiekintveld, Charles A Kamhoua, Md. Abu Sayed, Ahmed Ann Noor Ryen, Ahmed Hemida
4. When to Deceive: A Cross-Layer Stackelberg Game Framework for Strategic Timing of Cyber Deception
   Ya-Ting Yang, Quanyan Zhu
5. Strategic Deception in a Cyber-Physical Reconnaissance-Assisted Routing Game
   Ahmad Bilal Asghar, Charles A Kamhoua

Session 2: Incentive Design

26 October, 16:00–17:30

1. When to Cut the Rope: Optimal Timing of Cyber-Defense Interventions Against Adaptive Advanced Persistent Threats
   Willie Kouam, Stefan Rass
2. Understanding Federated Learning Through the Lens of Mechanism Design: The Role of Data Heterogeneity
   Lina Alkarmi, Po-Yen Chen, Mingyan Liu
3. Using Pay-For-Performance to Incentivize Component-Level Security
   John Chester, Adam K. Hastings
4. The Game Changer Problem: Controlling Equilibria with Discrete Rewards
   Brandon Han, Young Wu, Shiyun Cheng, Jerry Zhu
5. The Oracle’s Gambit: A Game-Theoretic Framework for Responsible AI Release
   Christoph R. Landolt, Tobias Lorenz, Marta Kwiatkowska, Mario Fritz

Session 3: Game Solving, Opponent Modeling, and AI for Security

27 October, 11:00–12:30

1. Computing Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Imperfect-Information Games
   Sam Ganzfried
2. Pure Nash Equilibria under the Affine Mechanism: A Potential Game of Exaggeration
   Jason Jisen Li, Young Wu, Yancheng Zhu, Jin-yi Cai, Jerry Zhu
3. Offline Nash Solvers Meet Online Tree Search in Multi-Agent Games on Graphs
   Mukesh Kumar, Yue Guan, Panagiotis Tsiotras
4. Opponent-Pool Co-Training as a Diagnostic for Scaling Failure in Autonomous Cyber Defense
   Kevin Limanta, Edward Koh, Xavier Cadet, Simona Boboila, Alina Oprea, Peter Chin
5. Multi-stage Knapsack Games for Dynamic Resource Allocation under Sunk Commitments
   Omkar Thakoor, Rajgopal Kannan, Viktor Prasanna

Session 4: Agentic and AI Security

27 October, 14:00–15:30

1. Designing Around Confusability: Forward-Induction-Robust Permission Mechanisms for Tool-Using LLM Agents
   Hikaru Matsuoka
2. Honeyquest for LLMs: Rethinking Cyber Deception for AI Attackers
   Kerri Prinos, Lilianne Brush, Cameron Denton
3. Semantic Safeguards for Agent-to-Thing Interoperation in the Internet of Agentic Things
   Quanyan Zhu
4. Multiagent Incident Response Planning with Code Models
   Kim Hammar, Tansu Alpcan, Emil Lupu
5. A Self-Explainable Deep Architecture for Security Applications
   Ananth Shreekumar, JyunJhu Syu, Muslum Ozgur Ozmen, Dongyan Xu, Z. Berkay Celik

Session 5: Security Games

27 October, 16:00–17:30

1. Games over Observation Spaces in Multi-Agent Capture the Flag
   Mae Frost, Michael Amir, Shaunak D. Bopardikar
2. Decision-Focused Learning in Network Interdiction Games
   Luca M. Hartmann, Parinaz Naghizadeh
3. OSSGuard: A Game-Theoretic Framework for Trust and Security in Open-Source Ecosystems
   Javad Mokhtari Koushyar, Mina Guirguis, George K. Atia
4. BRAID: Learning Equilibrium Maps in Interdependent Security Games via Weight-Tied Iterative Graph Neural Networks
   Elnaz Nowrouzi, Zhiqun Zuo, Xueru Zhang, Mohammad Mahdi Khalili
5. Performative Security Games: Strategic Manipulation of Decision-Dependent Distributions in Learning-Based O-RAN Control
   Xingqi Wu, Junaid Farooq, Tao Li

Session 6: Game Theory, Opponent Modeling, and Information Design for Security

28 October, 11:00–12:30

1. Asymmetric-Information Resource Allocation Games: An LP Approach to Purposeful Deception
   Longxu Pan, Yue Guan, Daigo Shishika, Panagiotis Tsiotras
2. Information Design Against Gaming and Learning Adversaries
   Madhava Gaikwad
3. Consistent Opponent Modeling in Imperfect-Information Games
   Sam Ganzfried
4. A Bayesian Correlated Equilibrium for Early Insider-Threat Detection
   Javed M. Shah, Ian A. Kash, Natalie Parde
5. One Guardrail Is Not Enough: A Security Game for Deploying Complementary LLM Defenses
   Tarun Raheja, Nilay Pochhi